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I. INTRODUCTION
In a landmark 1995 report, the United States Department of Commerce
anticipated the great promise of the Internet to improve and enhance our lives.1
More than fifteen years later, that promise is being realized. The deployment of
high-speed networks, coupled with rapidly falling costs of production, has
provided access to rich cultural resources around the world, enhanced
education, and increased the opportunity for democratic participation in
government. The Internet continues to transform the production and
distribution of creative works, accelerating the pace of global creativity by
allowing ever more creators to produce and disseminate their copyrighted
works online and providing benefits for authors, copyright owners, users, and
the public at large. 2
Nonetheless, this rapid growth of Internet use, along with the development
of technologies that enable the unauthorized distribution of copyrighted works,
has fueled the explosive growth of online copyright piracy.3 The ability of
I Albert Tramposch is the Administrator for Policy and External Affairs at the United States
Patent and Trademark Office. Ann Chaitovitz, Charisma Hampton, Kevin Rosenbaum,
Aisha Salem, and Tom Stoll are attorneys in the Office of the Administrator for Policy and
External Affairs at the United States Patent and Trademark Office. The views expressed in
this article are personal observations of the authors and do not reflect the official positions
of the U.S. Government.
1 See Bruce A. Lehman & Ronald H. Brown, Information Infrastructure Task Force,
Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure: The Report of the
Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights 179, 182 (1995),
http://commcns.org/vmhMbx.
See FCC, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN 3, 10, 15-7, 58
(2010), http://commcns.org/sCCj9m.
U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-423, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
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digital products to be reproduced inexpensively and distributed immediately
around the world means that virtually every copyright industry is affected by
online piracy, including the music, motion picture, television, publishing, and
software industries.4
Online piracy and counterfeiting on a massive scale have a significant
impact on the American economy and consumers. According to the
Government Accountability Office (GAO), "[t]he U.S. economy as a whole
may grow at a slower pace," and fewer taxes will be collected by the U.S.
government due to reduced economic activity.5 While the estimates of the
economic impact of online piracy and counterfeiting are numerous, the precise
impact is difficult to determine due to a lack of credible data.6 Despite this
difficulty, "research in specific industries suggest[s] that the problem is
sizeable."7 Beyond the lost revenues of content owners, creators, and the
government, online piracy and counterfeiting also raises significant health and
safety concerns for American consumers. Unsafe counterfeit medicines
available for sale via the Internet, for example, pose a life-threatening risk.
Additionally, pirated software "may contain malicious programming code that
could interfere with computers' operations or violates users' privacy."9
In response to the challenges posed by online piracy and counterfeiting, the
Obama Administration has made intellectual property protection and
enforcement a high priority. Introducing the Administration's plan to combat
online piracy and other forms of intellectual property infringement, Vice
President Biden explained that "piracy is theft" and "hurts our economy." 10
Former Department of Commerce Secretary Gary Locke also underscored the
Administration's commitment to confronting the challenge of online piracy,
noting that, "[t]his isn't just an issue of right and wrong" but "a fundamental
issue of America's economic competitiveness."]1
This article discusses the current "state of play" with respect to the growing
threat of online intellectual property infringement. Part II discusses recent
OBSERVATION ON EFFORTS TO QUANTIFY THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COUNTERFEITS AND




Why Should I Be Concerned About Counterfeit Drugs?, NAT'L Ass'N OF BOARDS OF
PHARMACY, http://commcns.org/sfWLei (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
9 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 3, at 11.
10 Gauthem Nagesh, White House Unveils Plan to Combat Online Piracy and Counterfeit
Goods, THE HILL (June 22, 2010), http://commcns.org/rSVlp8; Rob Lever, U.S. Unveils
Strategy To Fight Piracy Of Intellectual Property, INDUSTRY WEEK (June 22, 2010),
http ://commcns.org/slBvj2.
Gary Locke, U.S. Sec'y of Commerce, Remarks at Intellectual Property Enforcement,
Belmont University, Nashville, Tennessee (Aug. 30, 2010).
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actions to confront online piracy and counterfeiting taken by private parties
and the government, and the legal bases for such actions. Part Ill discusses
recent legislative proposals to address online piracy and counterfeiting and the
concerns raised by critics of the legislation. While there are no simple solutions
to the manifold issues raised, and many recent legal actions and legislative
proposals canvassed in this article are controversial, this article concludes that
the right policy balance is necessary to ensure that the Internet realizes its full
potential as a platform for the lawful distribution of creative works for the
benefit of American creators, consumers, and businesses.
II. RECENT RESPONSES TO PIRACY
A. Private Actions
In an effort to address online infringement, some plaintiffs have brought
private actions and secured broad remedies to protect their intellectual property
interests on the Internet. For instance, in March 2010, apparel designers and
manufacturers The North Face and Polo Ralph Lauren filed suit against
hundreds of named and unnamed foreign domain operators.12 The foreign sites,
seemingly based in China and operating under names similar to the brand
names of the plaintiffs, were used to sell counterfeit North Face and Ralph
Lauren goods. The plaintiffs made various claims of trademark infringement,
counterfeiting, and deceptive business practices under federal and New York
state law, seeking damages as well as equitable relief.4
In response, the Southern District Court of New York froze the defendants'
U.S. accounts and issued a temporary restraining order enjoining them from
conducting business over the infringing sites.15 However, the domain name
operators failed to answer and continued to register more counterfeiting sites.
As a result, the court entered a default judgment awarding the plaintiffs $78
million in damages and issued a permanent injunction to stop the defendants,
as well as third parties (including ISPs), from using, hosting, or providing
12 The North Face Apparel Corp. v. Fujian Sharing Imp. & Exp. Ltd., No. 10 Civ. 01630
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2011). See also Anthony V. Lupo, David S. Modzeleski & Eva J.
Pulliam, Counterfeiting: The North Face Apparel Corp. v. Fujian Sharing Import and
Export, Ltd., 11 E-COMMERCE L. REP., AUG. 2011, at 6, available
at http://commcns.org/ssAOZN.
' North Face Apparel, No. 10 Civ. 01630.
I4 Id.
' The North Face Apparel Corp. v. Fujian Sharing Imp. & Exp. Ltd., No. 10 Civ. 01630
(S.D.N.Y. entered Mar. 30, 2010).
16 Id. (contempt order for noncompliance of defendants).
32011]1
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
services to the infringing sites.' 7
In December 2010, when the defendants still failed to comply, The North
Face and Polo Ralph Lauren sought and were granted a court order for
contempt. The Court ordered the domain name registries to disable the
defendants' domain names and transfer them to plaintiffs. Additionally, the
court instructed third parties, including "ISPs, back-end service providers, web
designers, [and] sponsored search engine or ad-word providers" to discontinue
and disable service to defendants' websites.19 In the event that the ISPs hosting
the defendants' websites were unresponsive, the court further ordered those
"responsible for allocating and/or delegating the IP addresses used by
Defendants' websites . . . shall, within three (3) days of being given notice, de-
delegate or otherwise deny access to the IP addresses used by those
Defendants' websites." 20 Finally, the Court directed ecommerce and auction
sites, like eBay, to delete the defendants' accounts and listings.2 1
The court's order was particularly important because it included a provision
that allowed the plaintiffs to shut down not only infringing sites already in
existence, but also infringing sites that had not yet been discovered or even
created.22 This stipulation directly addressed the difficulties of playing
"whack-a-mole" with infringing sites that, once shut down, would simply
reopen under different domain names.23 This issue is oftentimes a lingering
problem for plaintiffs, due to the fact that it is cost-prohibitive to seek legal
redress each time a new site appears.24 However, with ongoing authority to
give notice of the contempt order to infringing sites and related third parties,
the plaintiffs could continually initiate the shut-down and seizure of infringing
domains. In fact, The North Face and Polo Ralph Lauren have succeeded in
shutting down hundreds of counterfeit sites since their contempt order was
issued, a sign that this private remedy has been working to their benefit.25
B. "Operation In Our Sites"
As the United States Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator (IPEC)
Annual Report on Intellectual Property Enforcement explains, the United
17 Id. See also Tory Burch LLC v. Yong Sheng Int'l Trade Co., Ltd., No. 10 Civ. 9336
(S.D.N.Y. filed May 13, 2011) (order granting default judgment and permanent injunction).
18 North Face Apparel, No. 10 Civ. 01630.
9 Id.20 Id at8.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 11.
23 Id. See also Tory Burch, No. 10 Civ. 9336 at 7 (explaining the authority given to Tory
Burch, LLC to enjoin future websites created in violation of the order).
24 Lupo, supra note 12, at 6.
25 Id.
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States faces a great challenge in online infringement, which hampers consumer
trust, damages the economy, and poses health and safety risks. 26 Realizing
this, the Federal Government has committed to increasing enforcement as part
of its comprehensive approach to combating the growing threat of online
counterfeiting and piracy. 27 Accordingly, in June 2010, the National IPR
Coordination Center (IPR Center), in conjunction with the Immigration and
Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations (ICE) and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), initiated "Operation In Our Sites,", a program
designed to target counterfeit goods and pirated content distributed over the
Internet.28
1. Operation In Our Sites Seizures
Since its inception, Operation In Our Sites has resulted in the seizure of 350
domain names.29 The first sting operation seized nine domain names of
websites that offered first-run movies, music, and software.30  The second
26 See U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, 2010 U.S.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR ANNUAL REPORT ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 3-6 (Feb. 2011) [hereinafter IPEC ANNUAL REPORT],
http://commcns.org/tKv6Md.
7 Id. at 6.
28 Id. at 2.
29 See Federal Courts Order Seizure of 150 Website Domains Involved in Selling
Counterfeit Goods as Part of DOJ, ICE HSI and FBI Cyber Monday Crackdown, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Nov. 28, 2011), http://commcns.org/rOa0lr. It is important to
distinguish between the seizure of domain names and the blocking of websites. Information
is transmitted over the Internet using numerical Internet protocol addresses (IP addresses),
which are assigned to each of the network of computers that make up the Internet. See
Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187, 194-198
(2000) (discussing the development of Internet Protocol (IP) and Domain Name Systems
(DNS)). A user may enter the IP address of a website on a host computer allowing the user
computer to retrieve the website data. Id. Because an IP address is a complex series of
numbers that is cumbersome for users of the Internet to use and remember, a Domain Name
System (DNS) is overlaid onto the Internet. Id The DNS allows users to simply type in the
name of the website, and the DNS server does the rest. Every Internet Service Provider
(ISP) keeps a list of domain names and the corresponding IP addresses for each, which it
stores in its DNS server. Id. Each domain name includes a top level domain (TLD), or suffix
that identifies the nature of the organization that owns the website (e.g. ".com", ".net", or
"org"). Id. A company called a "registry" manages all domain names within a given top
level domain (TLD). Id. When the government seizes a domain name, it seizes the DNS
name-and only the DNS name-because that DNS name is the property of the alleged
infringer. See discussion infra Part II(B)(2) (discussing the legal basis for seizure). The
seizure leaves the IP address and the files that constitute the website itself intact. Internet
users can still access the website by typing in the IP address itself.
30 "Operation In Our Sites" Targets Internet Movie Pirates, ICE, Manhattan U.S.
Attorney Seize Multiple Web Sites for Criminal Copyright Violations, U.S. IMMIGRATION
AND CUSTOMs ENFORCEMENT (June 30, 2010), http://commcns.org/sdaAJi.
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seizure, dubbed the "Cyber Monday Crackdown," was executed on the busiest
online shopping day of the year (the Monday after Thanksgiving) and targeted
domain names linked to 82 websites many of which were alleged to sell
counterfeit hard goods and some that were alleged to sell pirated movies,
music and software. ' The third seizure occurred just days before Super Bowl
Sunday 2011, resulting in the seizure of ten domain names of websites that
featured sports and other pay-per-view events.32 "Operation Broken Hearted,"
carried out on Valentine's Day 2011, seized 18 domain names of websites that
illegally offered copyrighted and counterfeit trademarked goods. 33 The fifth
phase of Operation In Our Sites, executed in late May 2011, seized five
domain names of websites that sold counterfeit goods and illegally distributed
copyrighted materials. 34 The sixth phase, "Operation Shoe Clerk," seized 16
domain names of websites selling counterfeit goods, including shoes, boots,
sneakers, jackets, shirts, hats, and sunglasses. 35 The seventh phase dubbed
"Operation Strike Out," resulted in the seizure of 58 commercial websites
selling and distributing counterfeit sports paraphernalia. 36 The most recent
phase coincided with Cyber Monday 2011, resulting in the seizure of 150
domain names of websites illegally selling and distributing a variety of
counterfeit goods and copyrighted works.37
Some of the websites targeted in the Operation In Our Sites seizures were
alleged to be "linking" websites, which provided links to "cyberlocker"
websites containing infringing content, and at least one of the websites was
31 IPEC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 42; ICE Seizes 82 Website Domains Involved
in Selling Counterfeit Goods as Part of Cyber Monday Crackdown, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (November 29, 2010), http://commcns.org/roXzRA.
32 See Affidavit in Support of Application for Seizure Warrant 7, United States v. HQ-
Streams.com, 11 Mag. 262 (S.D.N.Y Jan. 31, 2011) [hereinafter HQ-Streams.com
Affidavit]; New York Investigators Seize 10 Websites that Illegally Streamed Copyrighted
Sporting and Pay-Per- View Events, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Feb.
2, 2011), http://commcns.org/scKyhE.
3 Sweetheart, but Fake, Deals Put on ICE, "Operation Broken Hearted" Protects
Consumers from Counterfeit Valentine's Day Goods, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT (February 14, 2011), http://commcns.org/snieHw.
34 ICE Puts the Summer Heat on Counterfeiters, PSA Released Last Month Now Has
Nearly 100,000 Views, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (May 25, 2011),
http://commcns.org/tkowa6.
Homeland Security Investigations Brings Counterfeit Designers to Heel, U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (July 28, 2011), http://commens.org/ulhYFS.
36 ICE Announces Results of 'Operation Strike Out'Protects Consumers from Counterfeit
Sports Paraphernalia on the Internet and on the Streets, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT (Oct. 31, 2011), http://commcns.org/soaCly.
3 See Press Release, Federal Courts Order Seizure of 150 Website Domains Involved in
Selling Counterfeit Goods as Part of DOJ, ICE HSI and FBI Cyber Monday Crackdown,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Nov. 28, 2011), http://commcns.org/rOa01r.
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alleged to be a cyberlocker that stored infringing content. 3  Since all the
domain names seized were websites with ".net," ".com," and ".org," which are
top-level domains (TLDs) managed by registries located in the United States,
ICE directed the registries to restrain and lock the domain names pending
transfer of all right, title, and interest to the United States upon completion of
forfeiture proceedings. 3 ICE directed the registries to point the domain names
to a particular IP address displaying a web page notifying users that the domain
names had been seized. 40 The new web page often provided a public service
announcement educating the public about the economic impact of copyright
infringement and trademark counterfeiting.41 However, since ICE seized only
the domain names and not the actual websites, it remained possible to access
the sites by using their IP addresses.
2. Legal Basis for ICE's Seizures
While ICE's actions in Operation In Our Sites have been directed against
some of the newest forms of piracy and counterfeiting taking place on the
Internet, they have been based on some of the oldest legal remedies and
enforcement tools in the Anglo-American legal system.42 The first of these
principles is civil forfeiture. Inherited from the English common law and
initially used to seize and forfeit ships and goods in admiralty cases, forfeiture
statutes evolved to encompass cases of tax evasion, bootleg liquor and, more
recently, illegal drugs.4 3 The result is that "contemporary federal and state
forfeiture statutes reach virtually any type of property that might be used in the
conduct of a criminal enterprise.""
With regard to online piracy and infringement, Section 2323 of Title 18 of
the United States Code provides for civil seizure and forfeiture of property
used in connection with criminal copyright and trademark infringement.45
39 See Verified Complaint 11, 16, 21, 26, 31, 36, 41, United States v. 7 Domain
Names, 10 CV 9203 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 9, 2010); Application and Affidavit for Seizure
Warrant 17, 37, 58, 76, 88,In re 5 Domain Names, No. 10-2822M (C.D. Cal. filed Nov.
17, 2010); HQ-Streams.com Affidavit, supra note 32, 14.
3 Application and Affidavit for Seizure Warrant 102-104, In re Rapgodfathers.com,
No. 10-2822M (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2010) [hereinafter RapGodfathers.com Affidavit]; HQ-
Streams.com Affidavit, supra note 32, TT 48-49.
4o RapGodfathers.corn Affidavit, supra note 39, 102-104; HQ-Streams.com Affidavit,
supra note 32, 48-49.
41 See ICE Puts the Summer Heat on Counterfeiters, supra note 34.
42 Robert Lieske, Civil Forfeiture Law: Replacing the Common Law with a Common
Sense Application of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 21 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 265, 271-281 (1995).
43 See J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 508-11 (1921).
4 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974).
45 18 U.S.C. § 2323(a)(1) (2006).
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Although Section 2323 was added by Section 206(a) of the Prioritizing
Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, its
provisions were not entirely new.46 The congressional record of the 2006 Stop
Counterfeiting in Manufactured Goods Act highlights the fact that Congress
was aware that bad actor websites might be seized under the new law.
Specifically, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont noted that:
[Current law] cannot be used to pursue forfeiture and seizure proceedings against the
computer equipment, website or network of responsible Internet marketplace
companies, who serve solely as a third-party to transactions and do not tailor their
services or their facilities to the furtherance of trafficking or attempts to traffic in
counterfeit marks. . . Companies must establish and implement procedures to take
down postings that contain or offer to sell goods, services, labels, and the like in
violation of this act upon being made aware of the illegal nature of these items or
services. It is the irresponsible culprits that must be held accountable.47
Section 2323 also incorporates the procedures of the Civil Asset Forfeiture
Reform Act of 2000 ("CAFRA"). 48 Under this statute, a seizure may take place
only after the government obtains a warrant under the standard procedures of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.49 Accordingly, an affidavit or sworn
testimony must be submitted to a neutral magistrate, establishing probable
cause to believe that the property is subject to forfeiture.50 During seizures
under Operation In Our Sites, ICE acted based on probable cause that the
domain names were property used or intended to be used to commit or
facilitate criminal copyright infringement. Thus, the domain names were
subject to seizure and forfeiture pursuant to Section 2323.52
Under this process, ICE must provide written notice to interested parties "as
soon as practicable" after the date of the seizure or else file a judicial forfeiture
46 See Prioritizing Resources and Organizations for Intellectual Property Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4262 (2008). Among other things, the PRO-IP Act re-
organized forfeiture provisions that had been added by the 2006 Stop Counterfeiting in
Manufactured Goods Act. See id; Stop Counterfeiting in Manufactured Goods Act, Pub. L.
No. 109-181, 120 Stat. 288 (2006) (codified in scattered sections of 17 & 18 U.S.C.).
47 151 CONG. REC. 25798 (Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
48 18 U.S.C. §§ 981-987 (2006 & Supp. 2010).
49 See 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)(2).
5o See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(d)(1)-(2).
51 See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(c) (2006) (prohibiting criminal copyright infringement,
including inter alia willfully infringing a copyright "by making it available on a computer
network accessible to members of the public"); 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (providing punishments
for violations of 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)).
52 See RapGodfathers.com Affidavit, supra note 39 T 4; HQ-Streams.com Affidavit, supra
note 32 5; Verified Complaint at 15, United States v. TVShack.net, No. 10 CV 9203
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2010). While the law is not settled regarding whether a domain name
constitutes property subject to seizure, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a
property right exists in a domain name because it represents an interest of precise definition,
is subject to exclusive possession of control, and a registrant has a legitimate claim to
exclusivity in a domain name. See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003).
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action against the property. 53 The domain name owner then has the right to file
an administrative claim for the property seized by the deadline set in the
notice. 54 Within 90 days of the filing of domain name owner's administrative
claim, the government must file a judicial forfeiture complaint or include the
property in a criminal indictment. More than half of the websites seized
have been administratively forfeited. 56 Failure to do so requires the immediate
release of the domain name to the claimant, so long as it is unlikely to be used
for additional crimes and the hardship from the seizure outweighs the risk that
the domain name will be damaged, lost, destroyed, concealed or moved. 57 If
the property has not been released within 15 days of the administrative claim
filing, the claimant may petition the district court in which the seizure warrant
was issued.
3. Legal Issues and Challenges with Seizures
One complaint with Operation In Our Sites is that the lack of an adversarial
procedure before a domain name is seized deprives the domain name owners
of due process. Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren, a long-time opponent of
Operation In Our Sites, stated that "domain seizures without due process are a
form of censorship. .. . While this might be enough for the seizure of stolen
cars or knock-off handbags, it is not enough for websites and speech on the
Internet." 59 Additional critics argue that the absence of a full adversarial
hearing presents an increased risk of improper seizure.60 David Sohn of the
53 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
54 Id. § 983(a)(2).
5s Id. § 983(a)(3).
56 According to ICE, 65 of 120 domain names ICE has seized have been administratively
forfeited as of April 26, 2011. See Press Release, New Public Service Announcement
Launched to Raise Intellectual Property Theft Awareness, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT (Apr. 26, 2011), http://commcns.org/veLw2N.
1 18 U.S.C. § 983(f)(1), (f)(8)(D) (an example of a hardship under the statute would be
preventing a business from functioning, preventing an individual from working, or leaving
an individual homeless).
5 Id. § 983(f)(3). To date, at least one owner of a seized domain name has filed a petition
with a district court under 18 U.S.C. Section 983(f) for release of the seized domain name.
Memorandum of Points and Auth. in Support of Puerto 80's Petition for Release of Seized
Prop. and in Support of Request for Expedited Briefing and Hearing of Same at 6, Puerto 80
Projects, S.L.U. v. United States, No. 11 Civ. 3983 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), appeal granted, No.
11-3390 (2d Cir. Aug. 19, 2011).
59 Rep. Zoe Lofgren, Lofgren, Wyden Question Response to Seizure Inquiries,
htt ://commcns.org/tyiKZR (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
Promoting Investment and Protecting Commerce Online: Legitimate Sites v. Parasites,
Part I: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Intellectual Property,
Competition, and the Internet, 1l2th Cong. 6-9 (2011) [hereinafter Online Commerce
Hearing I] (statement of David Sohn, Senior Policy Counsel, Center for Democracy &
2011]1 9
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Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) has noted that in such instances,
"mitigating factors and overbreadth issues may not come to light before the
name is seized or blocked. In a one-sided process, the risk of mistakes or
overaggressive action is high."61
Supporters of Operation in Our Sites believe there is no greater risk of error
in seizing domain names than there is in seizure of other types of personal
62property. In fact, since the content and servers are still available to the owner
and the website can still be accessed via the IP address, supporters maintain
that the risk of error for seizure of domain names is actually less than in
seizures of other personal property. These proponents also distinguish
between domain name seizure and forfeiture; while seizure is the act of taking
custody of property, forfeiture involves the involuntary relinquishment of
property as a consequence of the commission of a crime. Additionally, as the
Supreme Court has held, notice and hearing after the property is seized
satisfies due process when that property is seized "to secure an important
governmental or general public interest."
ICE repeatedly has noted that the Operation In Our Sites domain name
seizures are conducted as part of criminal investigations after judicially
66
authorized seizure warrants are obtained. As ICE Director John Morton
highlights:
Domain names seized under Operation In Our Sites are seized only in furtherance of
ongoing criminal investigations into violations of U.S. federal laws. . . . For each
domain name seized, ICE investigators independently obtained counterfeit
trademarked goods or pirated copyrighted material that was in turn verified by the
rights holders as counterfeit. After such verification, ICE applied for federal seizure
warrants based on probable cause. Federal magistrate judges approve criminal seizure
warrants based on probable cause for the domain names that are targeted. The
standard is exactly the same as in any other criminal investigation. As with all
judicially authorized seizure warrants, the owners of the seized property have the
Technology), http://commcns.org/sCSXbA.
61 Id at 7.
62 Terry Hart, Feds Seize Domain Names, COPYHYPE (Dec. 6, 2010),
http://commcns.org/vAUtBq. See also John A. Greer, If the Shoe Fits: Reconciling the
International Shoe Minimum Contacts Test with the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1861, 1885-88 (2008) (noting that domain names should
be characterized as property and thus subject to property law).
63 See Feds Seize Domain Names, supra note 62 (arguing that seizure of domain names
has a lower risk of error than other types of property seizures).
Larry Downes, Domain Name Seizures and the "Limits" of Civil Forfeiture, THE
TECHNOLOGY LIBERATION FRONT (Nov. 29, 2010), http://commcns.org/vpKty9.
65 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 676-80 (1974) (quoting
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972)).
66 Letter from John Morton, Assistant Secretary U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security, to Zoe Lofgren, Member, U.S. House of
Representatives (May 9, 2011), http://commcns.org/tmQRlx.
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opportunity to challenge the judge's determination through a petition.6 7
In the same way that "law enforcement agencies do not notify suspects of
impending criminal enforcement actions prior to their execution," ICE argues
that there is no reason to notify the owners of domain names prior to seizure
for suspected violations of criminal copyright and trademark laws.68
Critics of Operation in Our Sites also raise First Amendment concerns in
connection with ICE's seizures. They argue that seizing domain names of
websites that allegedly contain infringing or counterfeit material violates the
First Amendment by imposing a prior restraint on protected speech and
affecting lawful speech in a number of ways.69 Specifically, since Operation In
Our Sites targets entire domains, these seizures may affect a combination of
"lawful and unlawful content, including non-Web content like email or instant
messaging connections." 70 Furthermore, the existence of subdomains is
particularly troubling, because "[m]any web hosting services are constructed in
a way such that thousands of individual sites, created and maintained by
thousands of individuals, share a single domain name."71 As a result, should
Operation In Our Sites target one of these domain names, the seizure would
affect the entire platform, not just the actual targeted offenders.72
Some supporters of ICE's actions compare domain name seizures to the
confiscation of obscene materials, thereby concluding that Operation In Our
Sites fits within the boundaries of the First Amendment.73 Specifically, the
government must clear two particular hurdles for a seizure of allegedly
obscene material to be found constitutional. 74 First, the seizure warrant must
describe the targeted material with specificity.75 In the case of domain names,
Promoting Investment and Protecting Commerce Online: Legitimate Sites v. Parasites,
Part II: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Intellectual Property,
Competition, and the Internet, 112th Cong. 11-12 (2011) [hereinafter Online Commerce
Hearing Il] (statement of John Morton, Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security), http://commcns.org/t38zzN.
68 Letter from John Morton, Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Department of Homeland Security, to Zoe Lofgren, Member, U.S. House of Representatives
(May 9, 2011), http://commcns.org/tmQRlx. See also Online Commerce Hearing II, supra
note 67, at 4 (statement of John Morton, Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security).
69 Online Commerce Hearing I, supra note 60, at 9 (statement of David Sohn, Senior
Policy Counsel, Center for Democracy & Technology).
7 1 Id. at 6.
" Id. at 8.
72 Id. at 8-9 (discussing the recent example of "mooo.com" seizure under Operation
Protect Our Children, and stating that the tactics used by ICE were not narrowly tailored to
the criminal actors).
73 Feds Seize Domain Names, supra note 62 (noting that "[t]he law requires certain
procedural safeguards to protect against the abridgement of speech rights.").
74 See id See also U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
7 See Feds Seize Domain Names, supra note 62. See also Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S.
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the government met this constitutional requirement because "the seizures were
made pursuant to valid, specific warrants issued by a neutral, impartial
judge."76 Second, the government must obtain a judicial determination in order
to impose a final restraint on speech. 77
Proponents argue that the seizure of domain names is not a final restraint
because "the purpose of seizing these domain names is to establish and
preserve in rem jurisdiction for forfeiture proceedings." 78 Since users can still
access the site by its IP address and the site owner is not prevented from setting
up a new domain name, the seizure does not amount to a form of censorship.7 9
Responding to criticism that its actions harmed websites that facilitated
legitimate, non-infringing speech, ICE stated that:
All of the domain names seized through court orders obtained during Operation In
Our Sites were commercial sites, profiting from criminal trademark violations and
criminal copyright infringement through a combination of sales, advertising revenue,
and subscription fees. As a law enforcement agency, ICE has no interest in disrupting
lawful commerce or protected speech.so
ICE has also noted that it worked closely with the Department of Justice to
review "the existence, or lack thereof, of constitutionally protected speech on
each website" before undertaking any of its seizures.
The last issue critics raise in connection with Operation In Our Sites is the
federal government's jurisdiction over foreign websites and associated domain
names. While some argue that the U.S. government maintains jurisdiction over
these sites because their domain names are registered in the U.S., others regard
this nexus as insufficient,82 pointing out that, without a single jurisdiction,
individuals may be subject to prosecutions from a number of different
countries.83
ICE has recognized that many of the targeted websites are operated and
476, 485 (1965); U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.76 Feds Seize Domain Names, supra note 62.
Id. See also Heller v. NY, 413 U.S. 483, 489 (1973). A final restraint would include,
for example, being enjoined from using a particular domain name.
78 Feds Seize Domain Names, supra note 62 (critics to this argument respond that, unlike
real property, there is no need to preserve the jurisdiction or possession of domain names
re istered in the U.S., as there is no risk of flight).
Id.
8o Letter from John Morton, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, to Zoe Lofgren, Member, U.S. House of Representatives, at 4 (May 9, 2011),
available at http://commcns.org/tmQRlx.
81 Id.
82 Peter Walker, US Anti-piracy Body Targets Foreign Website Owners for Extradition:
Britons Could Face Charges for Breaking US Copyrights Even if They Have No Link to
America and Servers Are Based Elsewhere, THE GUARDIAN (July 3, 2011),
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hosted in foreign countries that do not have positive working relationships with
U.S. law enforcement.84 Since there may be no known physical assets in the
United States associated with these sites, "seizure of a domain name that is
registered in the United States is the sole law enforcement action available."85
Further justifying its jurisdiction, ICE notes that it investigates copyright and
trademark violations "only when there is a U.S. nexus, such as a U.S.
copyright or trademark being violated or an obvious intent to sell counterfeit
goods to American consumers." 86 The test is whether a website is "actively
used to violate U.S. laws."87
In a recent interview, Victoria Espinel, the U.S. IPEC, insisted that the goal
of asserting jurisdiction over these foreign websites is to protect American
citizens. Even if global operations cannot be contained, these seizures restrict
the access of these sites to the U.S. market.89 However, since the law used in
Operation in Our Sites provides jurisdiction only over websites that have TLDs
registered in the U.S., many foreign rogue websites that target U.S. consumers
and harm U.S. copyright owners remain out of reach. 90
4. Case Study: Rojadirecta
In order to understand the practical effect of Operation In Our Sites, it is
helpful to study the experience of Rojadirecta. To date, this is the only case in
which the domain name owner has filed a petition for the release of its seized
domain name.91 The owner, Puerto 80 Projects ("Puerto 80"), registered its
Rojadirecta domain names with GoDaddy.com, Inc., a U.S. company, despite
having a principal place of business in Arteixo, Spain.92 According to ICE,
Rojadirecta was a "linking" website that "collected and catalogued links to
84 Letter from John Morton, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, to Zoe Lofgren, Member, U.S. House of Representatives, at 6 (May 9, 2011),
available at http://commcns.org/tmQRix.
8 Id. at 7.
87 Id
88 Ben Sisario, Interview With the U.S. Copyright Czar, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2011),
http://commcns.org/tMeROl.
Id.
90 Margaret Grazzini, Four Rounds of ICE Domain Name Seizures and Related
Controversies and Opposition, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. BOLT (Feb. 23, 2011),
http://commcns.org/sme6xO.
See generally Puerto 80 Memorandum, supra note 58. See also David Kravets, Feds
Defend Internet Domain Seizure in Piracy Crackdown, WIRED (July 12, 2011),
http://commcns.org/t8LNOe; Dan Goodin, Site Appeals Feds' Unprecedented Domain
Seizure, THE REGISTER (June 14, 2011), http://commcns.org/rUnGF3.
92 Puerto 80 Memorandum, supra note 58, at 2 (Puerto 80 had condensed both
rojadirecta.com and rojadirecta.org into a single website known as "Rojadirecta").
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files on third-party websites that contained illegal copies of copyrighted
content," specifically live and previously aired sporting and pay-per-view
events. 93 In signing the seizure warrant subsequently executed by ICE, the
Southern District of New York found probable cause to believe that the
domain names had been used to commit criminal violations of copyright law,
and therefore were subject to forfeiture.94
As previously explained, a number of requirements must be met before
property can be released. 95 Puerto 80 argued that, at the time of its petition, the
Rojadirecta website had experienced a 32% reduction in online traffic as a
result of the seizure and that continued possession of the domain names would
"substantially and irreparably harm the goodwill of the Rojadirecta site and
drive its customers away."96 Puerto 80 also argued that the seizure of its
domain names constituted an unlawful prior restraint on its users' protected
speech under the First Amendment, imposing a further hardship under the
statute.97 Finally, Puerto 80 argued that the Rojadirecta linking material did not
constitute direct copyright infringement.98 In support, CDT, the Electronic
Frontier Foundation (EFF), and Public Knowledge argued that the seizure of
the Rojadirecta domain names violated both the substantive and procedural
requirements of the First Amendment9 9 and disregarded "important
international norms" by ignoring the judgment of two Spanish courts that
found Puerto 80 not liable for copyright infringement.'00
The District Court disagreed, holding that Puerto 80 did not meet the
requisite "substantial hardship" under the statute'0 1 The Court first pointed to
the fact that Rojadirecta had already transferred its website to alternative
domain names beyond the jurisdiction of the United States government that
could be found easily by the website's users. 102 The claimed reduction in
visitor traffic was therefore not enough to establish a substantial hardship.0 3
9 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Petition of Puerto 80 Projects Seeking Release
of Seized Property at 4, Puerto 80 Projects, S.L.U. v. United States, No. 11 Civ. 3983
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), appeal granted, No. 11-3390 (2d Cir. Aug. 19, 2011).
94 Puerto 80 Projects, S.L.U. v. United States, No. 11 Civ. 3983, slip op. at I (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 4, 2011), appeal granted, No. 11-3390 (2d Cir. Aug. 19, 2011).
9 See discussion, supra Part II.B.2.
96 Puerto 80 Memorandum, supra note 58, at 9.
" Id. at 10-12.
"ld. at 15-16.
9 Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff at
7-13, Puerto 80 Projects, S.L.U. v. United States, No. 11 Civ. 3983 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), appeal
granted, No. 11-3390 (2d Cir. Aug. 19, 2011).
'
00 Id at 13.
101 Puerto 80 Projects, S.L.U. v. United States, No. 11 Civ. 3983, slip op. at 3-4 (S.D.N.Y.
Au 4,2011).
Id at 3.
103 Id at 4.
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The Court also rejected Puerto 80's First Amendment challenge, stating that
"the main purpose of the Rojadirecta websites . . . is to catalog links to . . .
copyrighted athletic events," not for any discussions that may take place in fora
on the site. As a result, "the fact that visitors must now go to other websites
to partake in the same discussions is clearly not the kind of substantial hardship
Congress intended to ameliorate in enacting § 983."',1o
Since the Court found no substantial hardship, it declined to discuss whether
Puerto 80 would use the domain names to commit additional criminal acts if
the petition were granted and the domain names were released.106 Puerto 80
has since appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.107
III. POSSIBLE PATHS FORWARD
The Obama Administration, Congress, the states, business and labor also
have made stopping online infringement a high priority because of the
significant harm intellectual property theft causes the U.S. economy and the
threat it poses to American businesses and jobs. For example, in a letter to the
chairs and ranking members of the Senate and House Judiciary Committees, 42
state attorneys general from the National Association of Attorneys General
voiced concern that criminals have turned to the Internet to make incredible
profits while rogue websites based overseas are presenting law enforcement
with difficult enforcement challenges.1os On this issue, business and labor
agree that government assistance is needed to combat these threats. In a letter
dated February 15, 2011, 130 companies and labor organizations asked
Congress to take action to stop rogue websites from hurting their businesses by
selling counterfeit and pirated products.' 09 Although the harm to U.S. jobs and
the economy is difficult to quantify, no one disputes that online piracy harms a
number of important industries, including software, gaming, movie, music,
clothing, luxury goods and countless other industries.' 10
14id.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 5.
107 Order Granting Puerto 80's Unopposed Motion to Expedite Its Appeal, Puerto 80
Pr 0ects, S.L.U. v. United States (2nd Cir. 2011) (No. I1-3390-cv).
Letter from the National Association of Attorneys General to the Senate and House
Judiciary Committees (May 16, 2011), available at http://commcns.org/skoDIv.
109 See Letter from Businesses and Professional and Labor Organizations to Members of
Congress (Feb. 15, 2011), available at http://commcns.org/rCIBqC. See also Juliana
Gruenwald, Groups Urge Action On Bill To Combat Online Piracy, NAT'L J. (Feb. 15,
2011), http://commcns.org/v7Impq.
110 Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, Leahy, Hatch, Grassley Unveil Targeted Bill To
Counter Online Infringement (May 12, 2011), http://commcns.org/ux8GBg; Press Release,
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While DOJ and ICE have worked to quell the threats to American industry,
law enforcement agencies have found that existing law leaves little recourse
for stopping foreign owned and operated websites from stealing U.S.
intellectual property and selling it to U.S. consumers online.'I' Thus far,
Congress and the Administration have attempted to resolve the problem a
number of ways, including publishing lists of infringing sites to shame
countries into reining in rampant online infringement originating within their
borders.112 Nevertheless, these efforts have not been enough to stop online
piracy originating overseas in foreign rogue websites.
A. How Recent Legislative Proposals Attempt to Address the Problem
Congress recently drafted legislation to bridge the gap between ICE's ability
to institute civil forfeiture proceedings against domestic domain names and its
inability to combat piracy on websites that do business in the U.S., but are
registered and operate in foreign countries. On September 2010, Senator
Patrick Leahy and other members of the Senate Judiciary Committee
introduced the Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act (COICA)
to supplement the existing legal arsenal to combat the problem of foreign
websites that make infringing content available to U.S. users.113 However,
despite Judiciary Committee passage in November 2010, and several hearings
on the bill, COICA never received a full Senate vote.'t 4
As a result, in the next Congress, Senator Leahy again amassed a bipartisan
group of senators in the 112th Congressils to introduce a revised bill, known as
the Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of
Sen. Patrick Leahy, Senators Introduce Bipartisan Bill To Combat Online Infringement
(Sept. 20, 2010), http://commcns.org/sz4K3r. See also BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE,
2010 GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY (May 2011), http://commcns.org/uCmdxm
(estimating that $59 billion dollars' worth of software was used illegally last year
worldwide).
11 Press Release, Sen. Patrick Leahy, Senators Introduce Bipartisan Bill To Combat
Online Infringement (Sept. 20, 2010), http://commcns.org/sz4K3r.
112 See U.S. CONGRESS, THE CONGRESSIONAL INTERNATIONAL ANTI-PIRACY CAUCUS, 2011
COUNTRY WATCH LIST (2011), http://commcns.org/slubP3; U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW OF NOTORIOUS MARKETS, http://commcns.org/u8S5rj (Feb. 28,
2011).
113 See Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act, S. 3804, 11 Ith Cong. 4-6
(2010).
114 Nate Anderson, Senator: Web Censorship Bill A 'Bunker-Busting Cluster Bomb',
WIRED (Nov. 20, 2010), http://commcns.org/u7cCI9; Stephen C. Webster, Oregon Senator
Wyden Effectively Kills Internet Censorship Bill, THE RAW STORY (Nov. 19, 2010),
http://commcns.org/sFaEbL.
s Press Release, Sen. Patrick Henry, Senate Judiciary Committee Unanimously
Approves Bipartisan Bill To Crack Down on Rogue Websites (May 26, 2011),
http://commcns.org/urZNAr.
16 [Vol. 20
Responding to Online Piracy
Intellectual Property Act ("PIPA" or "PROTECT IP Act").' 16 PIPA shared
COICA's goal of providing a mechanism for law enforcement to combat
counterfeiting and piracy in the U.S. by enabling recourse against foreign sites
operating in the U.S. whose sole purpose is to profit from infringement of the
intellectual property rights of others.117 On May 26, 2011, the Senate Judiciary
Committee reported PIPA out of Committee. 118
The following sections compare the major portions of both COICA and
PIPA, addressing the threshold requirements for action, jurisdictional
limitations and authority granted to the Attorney General, and private rights
holder actions. These sections distinguish the financial transaction provider
and advertising services provisions of both COICA and PIPA, their potential
extraterritorial impact, and related Internet security concerns. Finally, the
article addresses the major First Amendment and Due Process criticisms of
COICA and highlights how PIPA deals with these concerns.
1. Authorized Actions Under COICA and PIPA
Both COICA and PIPA provide a different basis for actions against
infringing sites. Instead of seizure and forfeiture of domain names, as used in
Operation in Our Sites, the new legislation provides equitable remedies against
domain names to cease and desist from undertaking any further infringing
activities. Therefore, under the proposed legislation, no property is ever seized
or forfeited, but rather temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions,
and injunctions are directed against infringing domain names. The statutes
incorporate the protections of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as well.
COICA provided the DOJ with an expedited process for cracking down on
foreign rogue Internet sites and disrupting criminal enterprises operating online
by targeting the domain names "dedicated to infringing activities." 1l9 Under
the COICA definition, an Internet site was dedicated to infringing activities if
it met one of two prongs. The first required it to be subject to civil forfeiture as
a result of criminal infringement under 18 U.S.C. § 2323.120 Alternatively, a
website could meet this standard if it is primarily designed or marketed to offer
infringing goods and services or counterfeit products, or has no demonstrable
commercially significant purpose, and engaged in criminal infringement, and
when taken together, those activities are the central activities of the Internet
"1 Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual
Property Act of 2011, S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011).
See id.
11 Mike Palmedo, PROTECT IP Act Clears Sen. Judiciary Committee-Sen. Wyden
Places a Hold on Bill, INFOJUSTICE (May 27, 2011), http://commcns.org/uKduLL.
"9 See S. 3804 § 2(a)(1)(A).
120 See id. 4 2(a)(11(A).
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site accessed through the domain name that is the subject of the action.121
This definition set a high threshold for sites that could be targeted under the
legislation. Particularly, only sites subject to civil forfeiture for criminal
copyright infringement would be subjected to domain name disabling. Critics
of COICA, however, expressed concerns that its implementation would censor
websites, harm innovation on the Internet, and run afoul of the fair use doctrine
in copyright law and the First Amendment. 122 PIPA has attempted to rectify
some of those concerns revising the definition of an "Internet site dedicated to
infringing activities." Under PIPA, such a site that "has no significant use
other than engaging in, enabling, or facilitating" (1) the infringement of
copyrighted works in complete or substantially complete form; (2) the
circumvention of copyright protection systems; or (3) the sale of goods,
services, or materials bearing a counterfeit mark.123 The definition also
includes Internet sites "designed, operated, or marketed by its operator,
primarily as a means for engaging in, enabling or facilitating the acts described
above."l 24
Rather than including websites that accidentally distribute infringing goods,
PIPA focuses more narrowly on sites that have "no significant use other than
the engaging, enabling, or facilitating" the infringing activity, which allows it
to target only the most egregious infringers.125 Therefore, if a website makes
available or distributes infringing goods, but that distribution is incidental to
the site's viable, legal commercial purpose, it would not be targeted under
PIPA. Conversely, a website that exists solely to sell or distribute illegal copies
of protected works would fall within the scope of the legislation. These
websites are deemed the "worst of the worst" because they appear authentic
and are easily accessible by entering domain names that sound legitimate, but
exist instead to exploit and misappropriate the intellectual property of others.126
COICA and PIPA do not provide jurisdiction over foreign businesses based
on their overseas business, but rather jurisdiction is based on a foreign
businesses' contacts with U.S. consumers.127 As in COICA, under PIPA,
injunctions can only be issued against sites dedicated to infringing activity if:
(1) the domain name is used within the U.S. to access the site; (2) the site
conducts business directed to U.S. residents; and 3) the site harms holders of
121 Id. § 2(a)(1)(B)(i).
122 Declan McCullagh, Senate Panel Approves Domain Name Seizure Bill, CNET NEWS
(Nov. 18, 2010), http://commcns.org/tqM8HF.
123 See S. 968 § 2(7)(A)(i)-(iii).
124 Id. § 2(7)(B).
125 Id. § 2(7)(A).
126 S. REP. No. 112-39, at 3, 9 (2011).
127 See generally S. 3804 and S. 968.
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U.S. IP rights.'28 The legislation directs courts to look to a variety of factors to
make this determination, including whether the site provides goods or services
to U.S.-based users, offers services obtained in the U.S., and offers goods or
services for sale in U.S. dollars. Additionally, the court must examine whether
there is evidence that the site does not intend to provide, or has reasonable
measures in place to prevent, access to or delivery of infringing goods or
services to users located in the U.S. 129
COICA authorized the Attorney General to bring an in rem action and seek
injunctive relief against any domain name used by sites with a domestic or
international registry or registrar if the site was dedicated to infringing
activities.130 Following commencement of the in rem action, and upon
application of the AG, COICA authorized a court, in accordance with Rule 65
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to issue a temporary restraining order,
preliminary injunction, or injunction against the domain name.131 If the action
was against a domestic domain name, the injunction could be served on the
registry or registrar; if the site had a foreign registrar or registry, the injunction
could be served on service providers, financial transaction providers, and
advertising services.132
PIPA authorizes the AG and individual rights holders to commence civil
actions and seek injunctive relief against (1) a registrant of a domain name
used by a site dedicated to infringing activities; (2) the owner or operator of an
site dedicated to infringing activities; or (3) the domain name itself (pursuant
to an in rem action).133 Upon application of the AG or an individual rights
holder following the commencement of the action, a court is authorized, in
accordance with Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to order the
entity against whom the action was commenced to cease and desist from
undertaking any further infringing activity.134 These orders may be served on
the operators of non-authoritative domain name servers, financial transaction
providers, Internet advertising services, and information location tools.135 It is
important to note that PIPA authorizes a court to issue an injunction against
operators of non-authoritative domain name services and information location
tools only in AG actions against nondomestic domains; private rights holders
128 S. 968 §§ 3(b)(l)(A)-(B), 4(b)(1)(B).
129 See id. § § 3(b)(2), 4(b)(2).
"0 S. 3804 § 2(b)-(d) (2010).
'' Id. § 2(b) (2010).
132 Id. § 2(e)(1)-(2) (2010).
133 See S. 968, §§ 3(a)(1)-(2), 4(a)(1)-(2). The terms "domain name," "internet site," and
"internet site dedicated to infringing activities," are separately defined in § 2 of the bill. See
id. §2(1), (6)-(7).
I 4 See id. §§ 3(b)(1), 4(b)(1)-(2).
13 Id. §§ 3(d)(1), 4(d)(1).
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are denied an injunction against these entities.
2. "Indirect Enforcement": Financial Transaction Provider and Advertising
Services Provisions
Both the DOJ and individual rights holders face obstacles when confronting
and deterring rogue websites dedicated to infringing activities directed at
American consumers. Operators of rogue websites are difficult to target
directly and can often act with relative impunity.136 These websites operate
with the appearance of legitimacy, in part, because they often accept payment
for their infringing wares through established credit card companies, banks,
and related payment processing entities.137 Additionally, advertisements for
legitimate products and services appear on these website, providing an
important source of revenue for the operators.138 Paid advertisements or
sponsored links for rogue websites also frequently appear in search engine
results, and as a result, such advertisements readily reach American
consumers.139 Problems like these have prompted legislation aimed at cutting
off such revenue streams to rogue websites and include provisions to secure
cooperation from third party entities like financial transaction providers and
Internet advertising services.140
136 See S. REP. No. 112-39, at 3-4 (2011) ("[B]ecause this theft is veiled by the
complexities of the online world and many of the perpetrators are located overseas, the task
of enforcing U.S. intellectual property laws on the Internet is a difficult one."); Targeting
Websites Dedicated to Stealing American Intellectual Property: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 2 (2011) [hereinafter IP Theft Hearing] (statement of
Tom Adams, Chief Executive Officer, Rosetta Stone Inc.), http://commcns.org/seDQGM
(testifying that Rosetta Stone's customer care department receives calls from U.S.
consumers who have mistakenly purchased pirated products over the Internet and that most
of the purchases are made from rogue websites "based in China, Russia and other foreign
countries, beyond the reach of U.S. law enforcement").
137 See S. REP. No. 112-39, at 3-4 (2011) (counterfeiters' websites appear legitimate, in
part, because, "they often accept payment through well respected credit card companies").
138 See id. (to appear legitimate, counterfeiters' websites "often run advertisements from
trusted companies").
' IP Theft Hearing, supra note 136, at 5-6 (statement of Tom Adams, Chief Executive
Officer, Rosetta Stone Inc.) ("[T]he most common way for "rogue" websites ... to reach
out to American consumers is by means of paid advertisements on search engines such as
Goo le.").
S. REP. No. 112-39, at 7 (2011) ("These parties monetize the Internet site by enabling
U.S. consumers to access the infringing website, to purchase content and products off the
website, and to view advertisements on the website. Without partnering with these entities,
the financial incentive to run an infringing site is greatly diminished."); IP Theft Hearing,
supra note 136, at 5 (statement of Tom Adams, Chief Executive Officer, Rosetta Stone Inc.)
(noting that the inability of rogue websites to "utilize payment processors to transact sales
with consumers will go a long way in disrupting the flow of counterfeit goods and services
into the United States.").
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COICA authorized the Attorney General, in actions against non-domestic
domains, to serve the injunction on financial transaction providers and services
that provide advertisements to Internet sites. 14 1 PIPA made these remedies
available in actions by private rights holders, as well as in actions against
domestic domains.142 Under both COICA and PIPA, these third parties are
required to implement certain "reasonable measures."l 43 Financial transaction
providers must ensure that their services prevent, prohibit, or suspend the
completion of payment transactions between U.S. customers and sites
associated with targeted domain names.144 Additionally, COICA required
financial transaction providers to provide notice to the site that it "is not
authorized to use the trademark of the financial transaction provider."145 PIPA
eliminated the remedy prohibiting utilization of the financial service providers'
trademarks in response to financial transaction providers' concerns about
blocking use of trademarks in foreign territories.146
Once served with a copy of the court order/injunction, COICA required ad
service providers to "take reasonable measures, as expeditiously as reasonable,
to prevent its network from providing advertisements to an Internet site
associated with such [nondomestic] domain name."147 Companies who had
been victimized by infringers testified that this remedy was insufficient.' 48 For
example, Rosetta Stone argued that ads for infringing sites should also be
prohibited.149 In response to these worries, PIPA compels ad service providers
to, inter alia, "cease making available advertisements for that site, or paid or
141 S. 3804 § 2(e)(2). In addition to serving financial transaction providers and Internet
advertising services with such court orders, the Attorney General was, in actions against
nondomestic domains names, also permitted to serve the orders on domain name system
servers and providers of information location tools.
142 See S. 968 §§ 3(d)(2)(B)&(C), 4(d)(2)(A)&(B)
143 See S. 968 §§ 3(d)(2), 4(d)(2); S. 3804 § 2(e)(2)(B).
'" See S. 3804 § 2(e)(2)(B)(ii)(I); S. 968, §§ 3(d)(2)(B), 4(d)(2)(A).
14s S. 3804 § 2(e)(2)(B)(ii)(II).
146 IP Theft Hearing, supra note 136, at 19-20 (statement of Denise Yee, Senior
Trademark Counsel, Visa Inc.) ("If COICA is reintroduced . . . [a financial transaction
provider] should be permitted to authorize the continued use of its trademark on foreign
sites in accordance with its contractual obligations."). Compare S. 968 §§ 3(d)(2)(B),
4(d)(2)(A) (lacking a requirement financial transaction processors notify websites they are
unauthorized to use the processors trademarked logo), with S. 3804 § 2(e)(2)(B)(ii)(I)-(II)
(requiring trademark takedown notice by a financial transaction provider). For more
information on why financial transaction providers were concerned with COICA's
re uirement, see the discussion of the allofmp3.com case in Russia, infra Part III.B.3.
47 S. 3804 § 2(e)(2)(B)(iii).
148 IP Theft Hearing, supra note 136, at 4-6 (statement of Tom Adams, Chief Executive
Officer, Rosetta Stone Inc.) (arguing that restricting counterfeiters access advertising
networks, payment processing and paid search engine results must be combined to
effectively thwart infringement).149 See id. at 5-6 (statement of Tom Adams, Chief Executive Officer, Rosetta Stone Inc.).
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sponsored search results, links or other placements that provide access to the
domain name." 150
Starving rogue websites of revenue is not a novel concept. For example, the
Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 ("UIGEA") prohibits
the operators of Internet gambling websites from knowingly accepting or
processing financial transactions in connection with a wager that is unlawful
under a federal or state law.151 While financial transaction providers are almost
entirely immune from the statute's criminal and civil remedies,152 they are still
subject to legal obligations with respect to transactions involving unlawful
Internet gambling. 153 Indeed, the financial service provider obligations
contained in the law are at the core of the UIGEA's attempt to financially
starve unlawful Internet gambling by cutting off its primary means of funding.
These obligations require financial institutions to identify and block
transactions with businesses and websites engaged in unlawful Internet
gambling. 154
150 See S. 968 §§ 3(d)(2)(C)(ii), 4(d)(2)(B)(ii).
'15 See Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, 31 U.S.C. § 5363 (2006).152 With respect to civil proceedings/remedies, the UIGEA broadly authorizes the
Attorney General of the United States and the attorney general of any state to institute civil
proceedings in any federal district court to prevent and enjoin the types of financial
transactions restricted by Id. § 5363 (regardless of whether there has been a criminal
prosecution). Id. § 5365(a)-(b) (2006). The law authorizes the district courts to enter
temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions or permanent injunctions against "any
person" in an effort to prevent or restrain transactions prohibited by 31 U.S.C. § 5363. Id. §
5365(b). Similar to the criminal provisions, there is a carve-out for financial transaction
providers regarding the application of civil injunctive remedies. Specifically, § 5365(d)
restricts the U.S. Attorney General and the state attorneys general from instituting civil
proceedings (pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 5365) against any financial transaction provider
(assuming that the person is indeed acting as a genuine financial transaction provider). Id. §
5365(d). The Act also strictly limits the application § 5365 civil relief against interactive
computer services "to the removal of, or disabling of access to, an online site violating
section 5363, or a hypertext link to an online site violating such section, that resides on a
computer server that such service controls or operates." Id. § 5365(c). The only scenario
under which a financial transaction provider or interactive computer service could be subject
to the UIGEA's criminal and/or civil remedies is where such an entity "has actual
knowledge and control of bets and wagers," and operates an Internet website through which
unlawful bets may be placed or received or owns or controls, or is owned or controlled by,
any person who operates an Internet website where unlawful bets may be placed or
received. Id. § 5367.
153 The legislative history of the UIGEA states the primary reason for this back door
approach, namely, that "most of the estimated 2,000 internet gambling sites today operate
from offshore locations in the Caribbean and elsewhere. As such, they operate effectively
beyond the reach of U.S. regulators and law enforcement as well as the statutory anti-money
laundering regimes that apply to U.S.-based casinos." See H.R. REP. No. 109-412, at 8-9
(2006).
1' See 31 U.S.C. § 5364(a). The UIGEA mandated that the Secretary of Treasury and the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve jointly enact regulations. 31 U.S.C. § 5364(b).
These agencies adopted identical regulations. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 233.1-.7 (2011); 31 C.F.R.
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Credit card companies can meet UIGEA's requirements by implementing a
transactional coding system capable of denying authorization for transactions
that have been coded as a restricted unlawful Internet gambling transaction.'55
The overriding purpose of these regulations is to require the designated
payment systems (and the financial transaction provider participants within
those payment systems) to establish written policies and procedures reasonably
designed to identify and block, or otherwise prevent or prohibit, restricted
transactions. These coding mechanisms could be employed to deny
transactions with websites identified as dedicated to infringing activities under
the procedures outlined in PIPA.
In return for their compliance with the order and the statutory mandates,
PIPA provides certain protections and immunities to any third parties required
to take action under the statute. First, PIPA provides complete immunity from
lawsuits and liability for any act taken by a third party that is reasonably
designed to comply with the Act or reasonably arises from a court order
received by the third party. 157 Second, third parties who receive such orders
will not be required to take action that is not technically feasible or would
cause an "unreasonable economic burden." Finally, the bill encourages
voluntary action by financial transaction providers and Internet advertising
services and provides a safe harbor from damages in the event that such third
party, in the absence of a formal court order under PIPA, voluntarily takes
action already authorized by the legislation regarding an Internet site that it
reasonably believes is dedicated to infringing activities.1
§§ 132.1-.7 (2010).
's See 12 C.F.R. § 233.6(d)(1)(ii); 31 U.S.C. § 132.6(d)(1)(ii). The regulations for credit
card companies were "based on coding frameworks that ha[d] already been instituted by the
operators of the major 'open' card systems, such as Visa, MasterCard and American
Express." See 73 Fed. Reg. 69,382, 69,389 (Nov. 18, 2008). IP Theft Hearing, supra note
136, at 5 (statement of Denise Yee, Senior Trademark Counsel, Visa Inc.) (noting that, "In
response to the [UIGEA], Visa devised a coding and blocking scheme that prevents U.S.
cardholders from engaging in illegal internet gambling.").
151 See 31 U.S.C. § 5364(a).
See S. 968 §§ 3(d)(5)(A)-(B), 4(d)(5)(A)-(B).
See id. §§ 3(e)(3), 4(e)(3). Assertions of technical feasibility or economic hardship
would, under the terms of the bill, need to be asserted as an affirmative defense to a separate
action authorized by § 3(e)(1) and § 4(e)(1) to compel compliance from third parties that
have knowingly and willfully failed to comply with court orders they have received. Id. §§
3 (e) 1,4(e)(1).
See id. § 5(a). See also IP Theft Hearing, supra note 136, at 5 (statement of Denise
Yee, Senior Trademark Counsel, Visa Inc.) (noting other areas where Visa works
cooperatively with the private sector and law enforcement agencies to combat other forms
of illegal activity that online merchants engage in such as child pornography, identity theft,
data breaches, illegal tobacco sales, and counterfeit pharmaceutical sales); DPE Commends
Agreements to Curb Digital Theft, Notes Government Leadership, THE DEPARTMENT FOR
PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES (AFL-CIO) (July 12, 2011), http://commcns.org/sRBWyM
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3. Recourse Against Domain Names and Service Providers
Actions brought pursuant to Operation in Our Sites are limited to Internet
sites with a U.S.-based registry.160 This limitation is problematic because many
rogue websites are not domestic.161 COICA targeted this issue by authorizing
the AG to bring in rem actions for injunctions against domain names used by
sites dedicated to infringing activities that had a domestic or non-domestic
registry or registrar.162 If the domain name had a non-domestic registry or
registrar, the statute permitted an in rem action if those sites were dedicated to
infringing activity, conducted business directed at U.S. residents, and harmed
holders of U.S. intellectual property rights.163 As with current law, this action
would have only been against the domain name and not the site. The
injunctions permitted under COICA could be served on non-related entities
involved in the domain name system: the registry/registrar of domestic
domains, who would have to suspend operation of and lock the domain name,
and service providers for non-domestic domains, who would have to block the
domain name from resolving to the IP address.1
PIPA made a number of changes to COICA to ensure that third parties who
may be required to take action as result of a court order receive notice and an
opportunity to participate in the proceeding. As with COICA, although with
additional due process protections, orders granted in actions brought by the AG
against nondomestic domain names may be served on operators of non-
authoritative domain name system serversl66 (presumably, ISPs) and
(documenting where different payment system operators voluntarily agreed to maintain
procedures to suspend or terminate payment services to merchants that intentionally and
systematically infringing products over the Internet); Greg Sandoval, MasterCard Willing to
Cut OffPirate Sites, CNET NEWS (Dec. 16, 2010), http://commcns.org/rRAZMT.
160 See discussion, supra Part II.B. I.
161 See S. REP. No. 112-39, at 3-4 (2011).
162 S. 3804 § 2(c).
" Id. § 2(d)(2)(A).
'6 Id § (2)(e)(1)-(2). The definition of service provider in COICA borrows from the very
broad definition in 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1). It includes 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A) (defining a
"'service provider" as "an entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of
connections for digital online communications, between or among points specified by a
user, of material of the user's choosing, without modification to the content of the material
as sent or received") as well as 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B) (defining a "service provider" as
"a provider of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor, and
includes an entity described in subparagraph (A)"). As a result, information location tools
are included under this definition.165 See discussion, infra Part III.B.2.
166 Non-authoritative name servers do not contain copies of any domains. Instead they
have a cache file that is constructed from all the DNS lookups it has performed in the past
for which it has gotten an authoritative response. When a non-authoritative server queries an
authoritative server and receives an authoritative answer, it passes that answer along to the
querier as an authoritative answer. Thus, non-authoritative servers can answer
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information location tools. 1 Unlike COICA, PIPA does not authorize
recourse against registries and only permits recourse via non-authoritative
domain name servers or information location tools in AG actions against non-
domestic domain names.168
When served with an injunction against a site dedicated to infringing
activity, non-authoritative domain name system servers must take the "least
burdensome technically feasible and reasonable measures" to prevent the
domain name from resolving to the IP address.169 Information location tools
must remove or disable access to the Internet site associated with the domain
name, rather than the domain name itself, which might include parallel sites as
well.170 Information location tool providers also must refrain from providing
hyperlinks to the infringing site.1 ' These remedies are unavailable to private
rights holders and in AG actions against domestic domains.172 Presumably, the
AG would use the current law to proceed against domestic domain names in
order to block the domain names.173
PIPA provides immunity from lawsuits and liability for any act by a non-
authoritative domain name system server or provider of information location
tools that is reasonably designed to comply with the Act or reasonably arises
from a court order.174 Third parties who receive such orders will not be
required to take action that is not technically feasible or that would cause an
economic burden.' 75 However, PIPA does not provide a safe harbor for
damages arising from voluntary actions taken by non-authoritative domain
name system servers and information location tools providers, as it does for
advertising services and financial transaction providers.176
authoritatively for a given resolution request. However, non-authoritative servers are not
authoritative for any domain they do not contain specific zone files for. Most often, a non-
authoritative server answers with a previous lookup from its lookup cache. Any answer
retrieved from the cache of any server is deemed non-authoritative because it did not come
from an authoritative server. See Non-Authoritative DNS Servers,
http://commcns.org/vBiOoa.
S. 968 § 3(d)(2).
68 Compare S. 3804 § 2(c), with S. 968 § 3(c)(1)(B).
169 S. 968 § 3(d)(2)(A)(i).
0 Id. § 3(d)(2)(D)(i).
171 Id. § 3(d)(2)(D)(ii).
172 Id. § 3(a) (noting that the Attorney General can commence action against non-
domestic domains).1 See discussion, supra Part I.B.
74 Id. § 3(d)(5)(B).
175 Id §§ 3(d)(2), 4(d)(2).
176 See id. § 5(a). However, Section 5 of PIPA protects these parties from liability if they
voluntarily stop providing or refuse to provide services to sites that endanger the public
health by selling or distributing prescription medication or adulterated or misbranded
medication or selling/distributing medication. Id. § 5(b).
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4. Private Rights ofAction
PIPA authorizes a private rights holder who is the victim of infringement to
bring an action against a domain name or the owner or registrant of an Internet
site dedicated to infringing activity.177 Specifically, Section 4 of PIPA enables
private rights holders and the AG to bring actions against both domestic and
foreign domain names.178
During Congressional hearings discussing COICA, rights holders argued
that it would be unrealistic to expect the DOJ to increase enforcement
significantly in a period of budget deficits and, therefore, urged Congress to
include a private right of action in the legislation.1 79 In essence, these rights
holders argued that they should not be forced to rely on the government and
should be able to seek recourse themselves.
Other parties expressed concern about private actions. Testifying before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, representatives from Verizon noted that "private
plaintiffs, unlike the DOJ, are acting in their own interests and are far less
likely to weigh the costs that their enforcement requests impose on third parties
and, more broadly, U.S. national interests in promoting a global Internet."180
As a result, private actions would result in "over-broad implementation of
domain name restrictions." 181 Similarly, Google argued that including a private
right of action in any legislation "would invite suits by 'trolls' to extort
settlements from intermediaries or sites who are making good faith efforts to
comply with the law."1 82
PIPA has attempted to incorporate these concerns. While Section 4 of the
bill provides for a private right of action against the registrant of the domain
name or the owner or operator of an Internet site dedicated to infringing
activity, its remedies are limited compared to the Section 3 remedies available
to the AG against nondomestic domains.183 For instance, a court order issued
1n Compare S. 968 §§ 2(1 1)(b), 4(a)(1)(A), with S. 3804 § 2(b)-(c) (naming the Attorney
General as the only party enabled to seek injunctive relief or commence an in rem action
against a site dedicated to infringing activities).
178 Although the Senate has noted that PIPA does not authorize the Attorney General to
bring an action against U.S.-registered domains, Section 4 of the legislation does authorize
the Attorney General to bring such suits. S. 968 § 4(a)(1)-(2). A "qualifying plaintiff,"
defined to include the Attorney General, may bring an action under Section 4. Id § 2(11).
179 IP Theft Hearing, supra note 136, at 6-7 (statement of Tom Adams, CEO, Rosetta
Stone Inc.).
' Id. at 6.
8' Id.
182 Online Commerce Hearing I, supra note 60, at 7 (statement of Kent Walker, Senior
Vice President and General Counsel, Google Inc.).
"' S. 968 §§ 3-4 (Section 3 authorizes Attorney General action against foreign rogue
websites, while Section 4 authorizes private rights holders and Attorney General actions
against foreign and domestic domains).
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in a private right of action that complies with the requisite notice procedures
can only be served on financial transaction providers and Internet advertising
agencies.184 While PIPA does not enable a private rights holder to serve a court
order on third party domain name system servers or information location tools,
it nonetheless gives private rights holders a wide panoply of enforcement tools,
especially in conjunction with other remedies. 185
B. Concerns with Recent Legislative Proposals
1. First Amendment Issues
Critics of COICA and PIPA raise First Amendment concerns akin to those
raised against Operation In Our Sites. For example, EFF argues that
"requiring search engines to remove links to an entire website raises serious
First Amendment concerns considering the lawful expression that may be
hosted on the same domain."' Critics believe that allowing authorities to shut
down entire domains, rather than only the allegedly infringing part of a
website, will effectively censor "vast amounts of legitimate, protected speech"
and that "by allowing this censorship of the internet the United States will join
the ranks of the non-democratic, totalitarian regimes of the world that already
engage in the practice." 188
Recently, a group of law professors submitted a joint statement to members
of Congress urging them to reject PIPA.189 In the letter, they note that PIPA:
authorizes courts to take websites "out of circulation"-to make them unreachable by
and invisible to Internet users in the United States and abroad-immediately upon
application by the Attorney General after an ex parte hearing. No provision is made
for any review of a judge's ex parte determination, let alone for a "prompt and final
judicial determination, after an adversary proceeding," that the website in question
contains unlawful material.190
Due to the lack of protections, the professors argue that PIPA falls short of the
Constitution's requirements for eliminating speech from public circulation.191
184 Id. § 4(d).
185 See discussion, supra Part II.A.
186 See discussion, supra Part II.B.3.
117 Abigail Phillips, The "PROTECT IP" Act: COICA Redux, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION (May 12, 2011), http://commcns.org/sBjhlk.
188 Proposed Bill Attempts to Take the Wind Out of the Sails of Internet Piracy, MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. BLOG (Sept. 27, 2010), http://commcns.org/scjJZ8.
189 John Allison et al., Professors' Letter in Opposition to "Preventing Real Online
Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of 201 1" (PROTECT-
IP Act of 2011, S. 968) (July 5, 2011), http://commcns.org/uKLHkb.




Supporters of the legislation counter that the bills are not constitutionally
overbroad. First Amendment expert Floyd Abrams claimed that the procedural
protections "are so strong, uniform and constitutionally rooted that it is no
exaggeration to observe that any complaints in this area are not really with the
bill[s], but with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure itself."192 Instead,
Abrams argues, COICA and PIPA focus "on a narrow category of entities
which are not simply trafficking in some infringing content, or occasionally
breaking federal laws, but which are primarily [and continuously] devoted to
providing or selling infringing content in the United States."l 93 While
accepting that some non-infringing or otherwise protected content may be
blocked as a result of a blocked domain name, Abrams posits that the proposed
bills are "sufficiently narrow to accommodate the immediate publication of
that content elsewhere and the future publication of the content on the same
domain."l 94 Additionally, he points out that under current case law, the
"presence of non-infringing speech generally does not provide a copyright
violator with immunity from enforcement actions.",195
Other supporters point out that the proposed legislation "provides that a
domain name may only be blocked after an in rem proceeding is commenced
and a court issues an injunction - preliminary or otherwise. As such, under
current law, COICA's provisions are no more a prior restraint than the
preliminary injunctions routinely ordered in infringement cases." 196 As a result,
it would be foolish to think that no case could result in a substantial amount of
protected speech being blocked.197 Nonetheless, the possibility of a violation of
a particular defendant's First Amendment rights does not mean that the bills
are unconstitutional on their face.198
192 Letter from Floyd Abrams, Partner, Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP, to Patrick Leahy,
Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, et al., at 8 (Feb. 11, 2011), available at
http://commcns.org/tefmoD [hereinafter Abrams COICA Letter]; Letter from Floyd
Abrams, Partner, Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP, to Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, et al., at 10 (May 24, 2011), available at http://commcns.org/uJSNLw
[hereinafter Abrams PIPA Letter].
193 Abrams COICA Letter, supra note 192, at 6; Abrams PIPA Letter, supra note 192, at
8.
194 Abrams COICA Letter, supra note 192, at 7; Abrams PIPA Letter, supra note 192, at
8-9.
195 Abrams COICA Letter, supra note 192, at 7; Abrams PIPA Letter, supra note 192, at
8.
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2. Due Process Concerns
Both COICA and PIPA offer greater due process protections than the
current law used against the domestic domain names in Operation in Our Sites.
While Operation In Our Sites relies on civil seizure and forfeiture,199 COICA
and PIPA provide for equitable remedies and do not create any causes of action
for seizure or forfeiture.200 In other words, the domain name is merely blocked,
not forfeited, and the owner of the domain name can move to modify, vacate or
suspend the order when it ceases any infringing activities.
Under COICA and PIPA, and in accordance with Rule 65 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may issue a temporary restraining order,
preliminary injunction or an injunction against a domain name, registrant of a
domain name, or owner/operator of a website to cease and desist from
undertaking any further infringing activities.201 Remedies under Rule 65
require notice and a much higher threshold than the probable cause needed to
seize domain names under Operation in Our Sites.202 In doing so, both bills
offer "the procedural protections that federal law currently affords all litigants
in civil actions in the United States." 203
To obtain a permanent injunction, the government must show: (1)
irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (3) that the balance of hardships between the
plaintiff and defendant warrants a remedy in equity; and (4) that the public
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.204 For preliminary
injunctions, the government also would need to show either a likelihood of
success on the merits or sufficiently serious questions to make them a fair
ground for litigation, as well as a balance of hardships "tipping decidedly" in
its favor.205 As a result, the AG would need to demonstrate a likelihood of
success on the merits rather than simply establishing probable cause.206
Rule 65 also provides that a preliminary injunction may issue "only on
notice to the adverse party."207 For a temporary restraining order to issue
without notice, two conditions must be satisfied. First, the facts contained in an
affidavit or a complaint must "clearly show that immediate and irreparable
199 See discussion, supra Part II.B.2.
200 S. 968 §§ 3(e)(1)-(2), 4(e)(1)-(2); S. 3804 § 2(g)(1)-(2).
201 S. 968 § 3(b)(1).
202 Id. §§ 3(b)(1); S. 3804 § 2(b).
203 Abrams COICA Letter, supra note 192, at 5; Abrams PIPA Letter, supra note 192, at
5.
204 See, e.g., Ebay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
205 See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 75 (2nd Cir. 2010). See also Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Google, Inc. 653 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2011).
20 See Salinger, 607 F.3d at 79, 80.
207 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1).
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injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can
be heard in opposition."208 Second, the attorney for the plaintiff must certify,
"in writing, any efforts that have been made to give notice, as well as the
reasons why notice should not be required."
209
Unlike the ex parte procedures used in Operation In Our Sites, COICA
required that, simultaneously to bringing an in rem action against a domain
name, the AG must serve the registrant with notice of the alleged violation and
the intent to proceed under COICA and must publish notice of the action
promptly after filing.210 COICA also permitted any party required to take
action based on a COICA order to petition the court to modify, suspend, or
vacate it based on evidence that the site associated with the domain name is no
longer participating in, or never was, dedicated to infringing activity, or if the
-211interests ofjustice so require.
Even with the numerous notice provisions outlined above, critics of COICA
argued that the bill provided operators of websites dedicated to infringing
activity more procedural protections than other parties who also might be
212involved. For instance, while the DOJ could impose obligations by serving
orders on domain name system servers, financial transaction providers, and
advertising networks, COICA did not allow these innocent third parties to first
have an opportunity to be heard in court, as it did for the operators of targeted
websites. 213
Heeding these concerns, Congress provided additional due process
protections in PIPA. Under the proposed bill, the AG first must attempt to
bring an in personam action; only if he or she is unable to locate the registrant,
owner, or operator, or if no such person has a U.S. address, may the Attorney
General bring an in rem action.214 This provision provides a higher level of
protection by enabling the site's owner or registrar to appear to defend the
215
action, if he or she can be located. PIPA also contains notice requirements
designed to protect innocent third party service providers. Any third party that
may be required to take action if the court issues an order must be identified in
the suit and provided notice when the suit commences.216 Identified third
parties may intervene at any time and may subsequently seek an order to
208 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A).
209 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(B).
210 S. 3804 § 2(c)(1)(B).
211 Id. § 2(h)(2).
212 See Letter from Markham C. Erickson, Exec. Director, NetCoalition, to Patrick Leahy,
Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, at 2 (Nov. 15, 2010) [hereinafter EFF COICA
Letter], available at http://commcns.org/shj6Gg.
213 See id
214 S. 968 § 3(a)(2).
215 Id § 3(c)(a).
216 id
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modify, suspend, or terminate an order.217 Additionally, court approval must be
obtained before an order may be served on an operator of a non-authoritative
domain name system, a financial transaction provider, an Internet advertising
service. or an information location tools provider. 218
The ability of the AG to use different laws to block access to domestic and
non-domestic domain names will create a situation where foreign domain
names have more due process than domestic names. For instance, the AG
would use the current law, which permits ex parte seizure on a showing of
probable cause, to block a domestic domain name, but would need to use
PIPA, which provides more due process to the domain name and affected third
parties, to compel Internet service providers and information location tools to
block a non-domestic domain name.
3. Extraterritoriality
COICA contained remedies that had a potential extraterritorial impact.
While financial transaction providers only needed to block transactions from
customers located in the U.S., the bill failed to place geographic limits on the
obligation of financial transaction providers to block use of their trademark or
the obligations of ad service providers and Internet service providers.
The law's expansive reach did not go unnoticed, and concerns about
COICA's extraterritorial impact were raised. In a November 2010 letter to
Senator Leahy, the NetCoalition noted that,
In addition to authorizing U.S. courts to exercise jurisdiction over foreign activity,
COICA creates extraterritorial remedies. A financial transaction provider would be
required to prevent the use of its trademarks on foreign websites. Similarly, an
advertising network would be required to stop placing contextual or display ads on
foreign websites. This would be the case even if a U.S. user no longer can access the
site or purchase infringing material from it. Once again, this could be a dangerous
precedent that could be exploited by other countries against U.S. businesses. 219
Visa worried that such a requirement would put financial transaction providers
in jeopardy of violating other countries' laws.220 For instance, it explained that
in 2006, it received a documented complaint by copyright owners that the
Russian website AllofMP3.com was infringing their copyrights.221 After an
investigation, Visa concluded that under Russian law, as well as the laws of the
majority of Visa's customers, the merchant's transactions were illegal. 222In
217 Id. §§ 3(f)(4), 4(f)(4).
218 Id. §§ 3(d)(1)-(2), 4(d)(1)-(2).
2 EFF COICA Letter, supra note 212, at 2.
220 See IP Theft Hearing, supra note 136, at 8-9 (statement of Denise Yee, Senior
Trademark Counsel, Visa, Inc.).




response, and after appropriate notice, Visa's Russian affiliate bank stopped
processing Visa transactions for the website.223 Visa was then sued by
AllofMP3.com in Russia.224 Finding in favor of the website, a Russian court
concluded that the bank violated its contract with the merchant and ordered it
and Visa to continue providing processing services.225 Although COICA would
not require Visa to block foreign transactions, a refusal to permit use of its
trademark might have also run afoul of Russian law.
Verizon and Visa suggested modifications to the bill to help alleviate
extraterritorial problems. Visa suggested that a financial transaction provider
should be permitted to authorize the continued use of its trademark on foreign
sites in accordance with its contractual obligations. 226 Similarly, Verizon
recommended modifications to clarify that judicial orders apply only to service
providers' DNS servers located within the United States. In doing so, Verizon
noted that a judicial order requiring a service provider to "restrict access to
domain names on international servers . . . not only increases the burden on
and cost for service providers, it may create an extraterritorial impact that
could open the legislation to legal challenge in foreign courts against which the
bill does not and cannot provide immunity."227
As to COICA's requirement that service providers block the domain name
from resolving to the IP address, if limited to Internet access providers, there
would have been an inherent geographic limitation because these providers
only provide access in a specific location. However, the definition of service
provider in COICA was not limited to the access providers, but also included
information location tools, such as search services like Google.228 Under
COICA, therefore, information location tools like Google presumably would
have been required to provide dead links or block access to its cache of the
infringing domain name's website. Moreover, since there was no geographical
limitation on recourse required by the service provider, Google may have been
obligated to serve up dead or no links in China and Russia.
While PIPA added remedies against financial transaction providers and
Internet advertising services in actions against domestic domain names, the
Senate made a number of changes to the bill to minimize the extraterritorial




226 See IP Theft Hearing, supra note 136, at 19 (statement of Denise Yee, Senior
Trademark Counsel, Visa, Inc.).227 See id. at 4 (statement of Thomas M. Dailey, Vice President and Deputy General
Counsel, Verizon Commc'ns Inc.).
228 S. 3804 §§ (2)(e)(1)-(2). See discussion, supra note 164 (definition of service
provider).
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authoritative domain name system servers have been geographically limited,
meaning operators are not required to take any measures on domain name
system servers located outside the U.S.229 Additionally, financial transaction
providers are no longer obligated to stop use of their trademarks on infringing
sites. Interestingly, PIPA completely eliminated remedies prohibiting
utilization of the financial service provider trademark, even in the U.S., instead
of prohibiting only the domestic use of the trademark.
However, PIPA does maintain some remedies that might have
extraterritorial reach. For instance, in an action against a non-domestic domain
brought by the AG, operators of non-authoritative domain name system servers
must prevent the domain name from resolving to the IP address in foreign
countries if the domain name system server is located in the U.S.23 Similarly,
in such actions, information location tool providers are required to disable
access and hyperlinks to the site associated with the domain name not only
within the U.S., but also in foreign countries.231 Finally, ad service providers
must prohibit ads appearing on or for the site in foreign countries as well as in
the U.S. 232
Even assuming that a law is presumed not to be extraterritorial, PIPA is
designed to reach non-domestic domains. Of its four possible remedies-
blocking financial transactions of U.S. customers, blocking U.S.-based non-
authoritative domain name system servers from resolving to the domain's IP
address, not providing advertisements, and requiring information location tools
to block access to the site associated with the non-domestic domain name-
two contain explicit geographical limitations, implying that the other remedies
do not have such limitations.233 The presumption against extraterritoriality,
therefore, may not be sufficient to limit the possible extraterritorial
interpretation of the non-limited remedies contained COICA or PIPA.
Many have also raised concerns about the potential consequences of the
extraterritorial application of U.S. copyright law.234 For example, VISA notes
that "[t]he extraterritorial application of U.S. law may invite retaliation by
other countries' governments."235 As the company explains,
229 S. 968 § 3(d)(2)(A)(i).
230 id
231 S. 968 § 3(d)(2)(D).
232 See EFF COICA Letter, supra note 212, at 2.
233 S. 968 § 3(d)(2).
234 See, e.g., IP Theft Hearing, supra note 136, at 16-17 (statement of Denise Yee, Senior
Trademark Counsel, Visa Inc.). See also Letter from Gregory A. Jackson, Vice President for
Policy and Analysis, Educause, to Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
at 3 (Sept. 27, 2010), available at http://commcns.org/uHuhsC; EFF COICA Letter, supra
note 212, at 2 (arguing that "this approach could set a dangerous precedent for foreign
countries to attempt to control content on U.S. websites.").
235 IP Theft Hearing, supra note 136, at 16 (statement of Denise Yee, Senior Trademark
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European countries, for example, believe that many U.S. companies infringe
European laws concerning geographical indicators. Under European law, only
wineries in the Champagne region of France can call sparkling wine "champagne,"
and only cheese manufacturers in the Parma region of Italy can use the name
"parmesan cheese." European countries could require payment systems [or search
engines] to stop processing transactions for [or linking to] U.S. merchant websites that
sell products that violate European laws concerning geographical indicators.
Similarly, repressive governments could force payment systems to stop doing
business with legitimate U.S. merchants that sell books critical of their regimes to
residents of their countries. 236
Although PIPA addressed many of the concerns about extraterritoriality, to
clarify remaining concerns, it could explicitly limit the other two remedies
geographically as well: "reasonable measures to prevent advertising networks
from providing advertisements on foreign sites' website displays in the U.S.
and to cease making available advertisements for the site, or paid or sponsored
search results, links or other placements that provide access to the domain
name in the US."237 and "reasonable measures by information location tools to
remove or disable access to the Internet site in the U.S. and to not serve up a
hypertext link to such site in the U.S. "238
Some argue that certain countries may rely on this law as precedent to
justify retaliation against U.S. websites. NetCoalition argued that "this
approach could set a dangerous precedent for foreign countries to attempt to
control content on U.S. websites." 239 It pointed to examples where "a French
court found Yahoo liable for hosting auctions of Nazi paraphernalia that were
viewable in France" and where "an Australian court exercised jurisdiction over
Barron's for alleged defamation in an article posted on a U.S. website." 240 In a
more extreme example, Visa noted "repressive govemments could force
payment systems to stop doing business with legitimate U.S. merchants that
sell books critical of their regimes to residents of their countries.,241 Of
course, limiting the potential extra-territorial remedies, as discussed above,
would help ameliorate these concerns.
Counsel, Visa Inc.).
236 IP Theft Hearing, supra note 136, at 17 (statement of Denise Yee, Senior Trademark
Counsel, Visa Inc.). Although the actual quote here addressed payment processor issues, the
payment processor language was modified to address this issue in PIPA, but the same issue
with respect to search engines has not been addressed.
237 The italicized text is the authors' suggested additions.
238 S. 968 § 3(d)(2)(C).
239 EFF COICA Letter, supra note 212, at 2.
240 id.
241 IP Theft Hearing, supra note 136, at 17 (testimony of Denise Yee, Senior Trademark
Counsel, Visa Inc.).
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4. Internet Security
As discussed, PIPA would deny users access to illegal sites in a slightly
different way than Operation In Our Sites. The proposed legislation authorizes
the AG to obtain an order that requires an operator of a non-authoritative
domain name server, including ISPs, "to prevent the domain name described in
the order from resolving to that domain name's Internet protocol address."242
This process often is referred to as Domain Name System (DNS) filtering.243
Essentially, DNS filtering prevents DNS inquiries for a particular domain
names from reaching the root servers for those names.244 Because DNS
filtering occurs at the ISP level, only customers of ISPs that have been ordered
to filter are denied access to the site; as a result, the site is still accessible from
outside the U.S.245 Advocating instead for DNS blocking in her testimony
before the House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and the Internet,
GoDaddy's Executive Vice-President and General Counsel, Christine N. Jones
explained the difference, noting that "DNS blocking provides a much more
thorough solution [than DNS filtering] because it applies to all Internet users,
regardless of which ISP they are a customer of or whether proxy servers are
used."246 While DNS blocking is currently employed in Operation In Our Sites
and is effective against sites that register their domain names with U.S.-based
registrars (.com or .net)-over which U.S. law enforcement already has
jurisdiction-law enforcement lacks the jurisdiction to apply DNS blocking to
prevent sites owned, operated, and registered overseas from offering pirated
and counterfeit goods to U.S. consumers. For that reason alone, DNS blocking
cannot be the solution for tackling illegal foreign sites.
Opponents of DNS filtering note that Internet security remains a top priority
of the Obama Administration.247 To improve this security, they argue, the
Federal Government must continue to promote the adoption of a new security
protocol, commonly referred to as Domain Name System Security Extensions
(DNSSEC).24 Generally, the protocol requires that any response to a request
242 S. 968 § 3(d)(2)(A)(i).243 See Internet Society Perspectives on Domain Name System (DNS) Filtering, INTERNET
SOCIETY, http://commcns.org/tnOKSI (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).244 Online Commerce Hearing II, supra note 67, at 9 (statement of Christine N. Jones,
Executive Vice-President, General Counsel, & Corporate Secretary, The Go Daddy Group,
Inc.
Id. at 10.
246 Id. at 9.
247 See CROCKER ET AL., SECURITY AND OTHER TECHNICAL CONCERNS RAISED BY THE
DNS FILTERING REQUIREMENTS IN THE PROTECT IP BILL 5 (2011),
http://commcns.org/syUOBr (in addition to being DNS experts, many of the authors are also
senior officials with ICANN, founders of their own Internet security companies, or advisors
to leading Internet companies on Internet security).
248 See id. at 5-6.
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from a particular site would include a verification that the site, and not a third
party, responded to the request.249 DNSSEC's main objective is to protect
consumers and sites from attacks in which an attacker intercepts a digital
conversation and steals the victim's security data by pretending to be a trusted
250
source.
Some concerns about DNS filtering are based on allegations that it will
interfere with DNSSEC. Specifically, opponents contend that "[r]eplacing
responses with pointers to other sources, as [PIPA] would require, is
fundamentally incompatible with end-to-end DNSSEC" because DNSSEC
compliant software would not accept a response that did not include the
necessary verification.251 Critics of this concern argue that DNS filtering does
not endanger DNSSEC because its effect will be extremely limited; only
websites listed on the court order will be blocked, leaving all other sites and
252their DNS data completely unaffected. They also note that any blocking
implemented via the proposed legislation would be entirely consistent with law
enforcement efforts to block other illegal activities, including the distribution
of child pornography over the Internet.253
Many also worry that DNS filtering risks causing collateral damage if not
implemented properly, including the inadvertent take down of legitimate
254
sites. They point to ICE's seizure of the website mooo.com that targeted 10
websites that provided explicit child pornographic content, but also led to the
wrongful takedown of over 84,000 subdomains.255 These fears, however,
neglect the fact that PIPA includes a host of procedural safeguards designed to
protect legitimate sites, as well requiring the AG to show that a targeted site is
dedicated to infringement, making such collateral damage highly unlikely.256
Moreover, ISPs already filter IP addresses to combat spammers, phishers, and
249 See id. at 6.250 See Matthew Lasar, DNS Filtering: Absolutely the Wrong Way to Defend Copyrights,
ARs TECHNICA (May 27, 2011), http://commcns.org/sPBWYZ.
251 CROCKER, supra note 247, at 6.
252 See George Ou, DNS Filtering is Essential to the Internet, HIGH TECH FORUM 6
(2011), http://commcns.org/tBK8VG.
253 See id at 5.
254 See id at 4.
255 See Thomas Claburn, ICE Confirms Inadvertent Web Site Seizures,
INFORMATIONWEEK (Feb. 18, 2011), http://commcns.org/ufeCLe. See also Press Release,
Joint DHS-DOJ "Operation Protect Our Children" Seizes Website Domains Involved in
Advertising and Distributing Child Pornography, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Feb. 15, 2011),
http://commcns.org/tHflEY.
56 See Press Release, Sen. Patrick Leahy, Leahy, Hatch, Grassley Unveil Targeted Bill
To Counter Online Infringement (May 12, 2011), http://commcns.org/ux8GBg (stating that
legislation was written to limit law enforcement authority to go after "the 'worst-of-the-
worst' websites dedicated to selling infringing goods").
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other commercially motivated undesirable conduct. 257
There may also be a solution so that both the filtering called for in the
legislation and DNSSEC can coexist without modification. Instead of
redirecting users, DNSSEC may be designed to handle an error message sent
from the user's ISP indicating that the site is blocked, similar to other error
messages currently sent by ISPs when a site is busy or down. 258 Detractors of
this compromise argue that DNSSEC compliant software could not accept an
error message instead of a verified response from the site because users "have
a need to distinguish between policy-based failures and failures caused [by
hackers]."259
Critics of the bill argue that customers of ISPs ordered to block sites will
stop using the ISPs' DNS server, and will switch to DNS servers that do not
filter, including those located overseas.260 By turning to rogue DNS servers
located overseas, they contend, users expose their financial and other personal
information to theft from the same types of criminals running pirate sites.261
They further argue that the filtering provisions of the bill will be ineffective
because of the number of circumvention tools that have been developed,
including the Firefox browser plug-in offered by MAFIAAFire, to
automatically redirect users to a seized domain name using the domain name's
IP address. 262
Because alternate DNS servers exist, it stands to reason that some users have
already made the switch and will continue to use alternate DNS servers.263
Even before users worried that law enforcement might block their access to
their favorite illegal sites, sophisticated users began switching to alternative
DNS servicers for other reasons, including improving access speed and
preventing phishing websites from loading on their computers.264 Thousands of
private open DNS systems already exist, with no indication thus far that using
such alternate DNS poses additional threats.265 However, most consumers will
257 See Ou, supra note 252, at 4 (noting that author Paul Vixie was instrumental in the
development of this type of blocking technology).
258 See DNSSEC Validation Failure FAQs, COMCAST, http://commcns.org/sUxWIu (last
visited Dec. 15, 2011) (explaining that the DNS will send an error message to the requesting
computer which will be displayed by its browser).
25 See CROCKER, supra note 247, at 6.
260 Id. at 9.
261 See id
262 See id.
263 See id 9-10 (stating that by turning to rogue DNS servers located overseas, these users
expose their financial and other personal information to theft from the same types of
criminals running pirate sites).
264 See Amit Agarwal, OpenDNS - What is OpenDNS and Why You Absolutely Need It?,
DIGITAL INSPIRATION (Mar. 16, 2008), http://commcns.org/ufGaZe.265 See Ou, supra note 252, at 7.
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not go through the process of switching DNS providers or installing a plug-in
just to access pirate or counterfeit sites.266 While some users may find it easy to
get around DNS filtering, arguably the bill achieves its purpose if it cuts off
these sites from the vast majority of U.S. consumers, making the Internet a
more "habitable environment." 267
Despite the criticism, denying access to illegal sites has yielded significant
positive results. Blocked sites often must move to new domain names, causing
them to lose the Internet ratings history they had acquired and hugely
impacting both advertising revenues and search result rankings.268 John
Morton, the Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), pointed
out that ICE's first action to take down illegal sites led many other sites that
offer pirated content and counterfeit products to voluntarily shut down.269
Commenting on the Operation in Our Sites' takedowns, he noted that he had
"never seen that kind of deterrence come from a single law enforcement
action" in all his years in law enforcement.270 Moreover, as Attorney General
Eric Holder noted, site takedowns serve to educate consumers of the risks
posed by illegal sites.271
While both sides of the issue make legitimate arguments for why blocking
access to websites may or may not conflict with Internet security protocols,
both sides lack reliable evidence to support their positions. U.S. consumers and
businesses should be able to use the Internet safely as their preferred vehicle
for conducting legitimate business, which includes being protected from both
counterfeiters/infringers and hackers.
266 See Press Release, Sen. Patrick Leahy, Senators Introduce Bipartisan Bill To Combat
Online Infringement (Sept. 20, 2010), http://commcns.org/uiYBgW ("American consumers
are too often deceived into thinking the products they are purchasing at these websites are
legitimate because they are easily accessed through their home's Internet service provider,
found through well-known search engines, and are complete with corporate advertising,
credit card acceptance, and advertising links that make them appear legitimate."). See also
Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at the Operation in
Our Sites II Press Conference (Nov. 29, 2010) [hereinafter Holder Press Release],
http://commcns.org/t6t8mh ("With today's seizures, we are disrupting the sale of thousands
of counterfeit items. We are cutting off funds to those looking to profit from the sale of
illegal goods and exploit the ingenuity of others. And, as the holiday shopping season gets
underway, we are also reminding consumers to exercise caution when looking for deals and
discounts online.").267 See Ou, supra note 252, at 4.
268 See Alexa Internet - Company Overview, ALEXA (Sept. 30, 2011),
http://commcns.org/srOfzl. See also How are Alexa's Traffic Rankings Determined?,
ALEXA (Sept. 30, 2011), http://commcns.org/uN5JzB.
269 See Juliana Gruenwald, Customs Chief Defends Seizure Of Domain Names, NAT'L J.
(Jan. 18, 2011), http://commcns.org/sJav8D.
270 Id.
271 Holder Press Release, supra note 266.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Internet is a powerful platform for the production and distribution of
creative works, providing benefits for authors, copyright owners, users, and the
public at large. But realizing the Internet's great potential will require meeting
the serious and growing problem of online piracy and counterfeiting.
Protecting intellectual property in the digital environment is essential to our
nation's economic growth, to maintaining and creating jobs, to protecting
consumers, and to the competitiveness of American businesses in markets
throughout the world. The Federal Communications Commission recently
stated the goal clearly and succinctly: "The Internet must be a safe, trusted
platform for the lawful distribution of content." 272
This article has canvassed a number of recent and proposed legal and policy
mechanisms to achieve that policy objective. One avenue is for rights holders
to bring private actions aimed at shutting down existing and anticipated web
sites that sell counterfeit products and distribute infringing content online.
However, actions against such rogue sites are costly, time-consuming, and all
too often futile because of the rapid pace of infringing activity over the
Internet. Another approach is for the government to use public resources and
procedures under current law to target such sites. Under Operation in Our
Sites, the U.S. government has seized the domain names of rogue websites
offering or linking to suspected infringing content. Unfortunately, rogue
websites based and operated in foreign jurisdictions effectively remain out of
reach of U.S. enforcement authorities. To fill such gaps in the law, legislation
such as COICA and PIPA has been proposed to provide recourse against
foreign rogue websites.
There is broad agreement that pursuing websites offering counterfeit goods
and infringing content will require new legal tools and tactics. However, the
policy implications of each proposal have come under close scrutiny in the
public arena. One option is to take action against payment service providers
such as credit card companies, effectively cutting off the revenue to the rogue
website. Another tactic under consideration is to prevent advertising networks
from placing ads on or for rogue websites. Finally, careful attention is being
given to proposals that would require the blocking of domain names to curb
online piracy and counterfeiting. Opponents of the use of the domain name
blocking raise, among other things, First Amendment and due process
concerns, while proponents argue that the practice is constitutional and a
highly effective means to deter illegal online activity. All, however, agree that
the right policy balance must be found to ensure that the Internet realizes its
272 FCC, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN 58 (2010),
http://commcns.org/sCCj9m.
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full potential as a platform for the lawful distribution of creative works, to the
benefit of American creators, consumers, and businesses.
